IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/wpaper/4759.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina

Author

Listed:
  • Martín Gonzalez Rozada
  • Lucas Ronconi
  • Hernan Ruffo

Abstract

This paper takes advantage of several reforms that provide time and cross sectional variation to identify the effects of unemployment insurance and severance payments on the duration of unemployment and on the separation probability in Argentina. Administrative data permits analysis of the duration of unemployment of covered spells with detailed information about transfers and their duration, while household surveys permit the study of separation probability and transitions to informal jobs, which are not observed in administrative data. It is found that unemployment duration increases significantly when unemployment insurance transfers are higher or are provided for a longer period; the effects of severance pay on unemployment duration are less robust. On the other hand, higher severance pay is found to reduce separation probability, while unemployment insurance transfers have a positive but small effect on separations.

Suggested Citation

  • Martín Gonzalez Rozada & Lucas Ronconi & Hernan Ruffo, 2011. "Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina," Research Department Publications 4759, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4759
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=36610110
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rafael Lalive & Jan Van Ours & Josef Zweimuller, 2006. "How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1009-1038.
    2. Meyer, Bruce D, 1990. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 757-782, July.
    3. Lucas Ronconi, 2010. "Enforcement and Compliance with Labor Regulations in Argentina," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 63(4), pages 719-736, July.
    4. David Card & Raj Chetty & Andrea Weber, 2007. "Cash-on-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(4), pages 1511-1560.
    5. Katz, Lawrence F. & Meyer, Bruce D., 1990. "The impact of the potential duration of unemployment benefits on the duration of unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 45-72, February.
    6. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    7. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, April.
    8. Álvarez-Parra, Fernando & Sánchez, Juan M., 2009. "Unemployment insurance with a hidden labor market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(7), pages 954-967, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Protecting Workers against Unemployment in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from Argentina
      by Maximo Rossi in Wikiprogress América Latina on 2012-05-22 21:38:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alan Finkelstein-Shapiro & Miguel Sarzosa, 2012. "Unemployement Protection for Informal Workers in Latin America and the Caribbean," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 4542, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Gerard, Francois & Gonzaga, Gustavo, 2016. "Informal Labor and the Efficiency Cost of Social Programs: Evidence from the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance Program," CEPR Discussion Papers 11485, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. -, 2016. "Protección y formación: instituciones para mejorar la inserción laboral en América Latina y Asia," Libros de la CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 140 edited by Cepal.
    4. Janina León C., 2012. "Educación, seguridad social y mercados de trabajo en el Perú," Capítulos de Libros PUCP / Chapters of PUCP books,in: Cecilia Garavito & Ismael Muñoz (ed.), EMPLEO Y PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, edition 1, chapter 10, pages 331-355 Fondo Editorial - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
    5. Martin Gonzalez-Rozada & Hernan Ruffo, 2014. "The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Under High Informality: Evidence from Argentina," Department of Economics Working Papers wp201403, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    6. Inés Butler & Gabriela Galassi & Hernán Ruffo, 2016. "Public funding for startups in Argentina: an impact evaluation," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 46(2), pages 295-309, February.
    7. Verónica Alaimo & Mariano Bosch & David S. Kaplan & Carmen Pagés & Laura Ripani, 2015. "Jobs for Growth," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 90977, February.
    8. Andrés Dean & Estefanía Galván & Ivone Perazzo, 2014. "¿Acceden al subsidio por desempleo los asalariados rurales en Uruguay? Análisis de la situación actual y simulación de esquemas alternativos," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 14-22, Instituto de Economía - IECON.
    9. Mariano Bosch, 2016. "Does unemployment insurance offer incentives to take jobs in the formal sector?," IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), pages 300-300, October.
    10. Janina León, 2012. "Calificación y Seguridad Social de la Mano de Obra en México," Working Papers 0612, Universidad Iberoamericana, Department of Economics.
    11. Gonzalez-Rozada, Martin & Ruffo, Hernán, 2016. "Optimal unemployment benefits in the presence of informal labor markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 204-227.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4759. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Felipe Herrera Library). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iadbbus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.