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Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected? A Model of Strategic Populists

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  • Sebastian Miller

Abstract

The existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Miller, 2011. "Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected? A Model of Strategic Populists," Research Department Publications 4716, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4716
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Berdugo, Binyamin, 2008. "What It Takes to Be a Leader: Leadership and Charisma in a Citizen-Candidate Model," MPRA Paper 11408, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Rudiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, 1989. "Macroeconomic Populism in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 2986, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2016. "The cost of doing the right thing. A model of populism with rent-seeking politicians and the economic crisis," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis1602, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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