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Creditor Rights and the Credit Market: Where Do We Stand?

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  • Arturo Galindo

Abstract

A recent survey has shown that the major problem faced by firms in Latin American countries is difficulty in accessing financial markets. Figure 1 summarizes the findings of the Business Environment Survey on obstacles faced by firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Arturo Galindo, 2001. "Creditor Rights and the Credit Market: Where Do We Stand?," Research Department Publications 4259, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4259
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    6. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    7. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 1998. "The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics," NBER Working Papers 6472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Eduardo Lora & Patricia Cortés, 2001. "Los obstáculos al desarrollo empresarial y el tamaño de las firmas en América Latina," Research Department Publications 4258, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Galindo, Arturo & Micco, Alejandro, 2001. "Creditor Protection and Financial Cycles," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1341, Inter-American Development Bank.
    10. Bernanke, Ben S & Blinder, Alan S, 1988. "Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 435-439, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Funchal, Bruno, 2006. "How much debtors' punishment?," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 615, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    2. Galina Hale & Assaf Razin & Hui Tong, 2006. "Institutional Weakness and Stock Price Volatility," NBER Working Papers 12127, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Suzanne Duryea & Carmen Pagés-Serra, 2002. "Políticas de capital humano: qué pueden conseguir y qué no en cuanto a la productividad y la reducción de la pobreza en América Latina," Research Department Publications 4298, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Laeven, Luc & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2005. "Does judicial efficiency lower the cost of credit?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1791-1812, July.
    5. Duryea, Suzanne & Pagés, Carmen, 2002. "Human Capital Policies: What they Can and Cannot Do for Productivity and Poverty Reduction in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1103, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Ana Carla Abrão Costa, 2004. "Sistemas Legais De Insolvência, Incentivos E Mercado De Crédito: Uma Abordagem Institucional," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 097, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    7. Shah, Attaullah & Shah, Hamid Ali & Smith, Jason M. & Labianca, Giuseppe (Joe), 2017. "Judicial efficiency and capital structure: An international study," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 255-274.
    8. Leopoldo Fergusson, 2006. "Institutions for Financial Development: What are they and where do they come from?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 27-70, February.
    9. World Bank, 2004. "Peru - Microeconomic Constraints to Growth: The Evidence from the Manufacturing Sector," World Bank Publications - Reports 14426, The World Bank Group.
    10. Anjali Kumar & Thorsten Beck & Cristine Campos & Soumya Chattopadhyay, 2005. "Assessing Financial Access in Brazil," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 7452, December.

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