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Creditor Rights and the Credit Market: Where Do We Stand?

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  • Arturo Galindo

Abstract

This paper reviews empirical evidence on the impact of creditor rights regulations on credit market breadth and the credit cycle. It confirms results that were questioned regarding the impact of creditor rights regulations on the size of credit markets, and shows that the degree to which creditors are protected has a significant impact on the potential size of credit crunches. Simulations suggest that the average credit to GDP ratio for Latin America could be doubled if creditor rights regulations were put in place and law enforcement increased to developing country levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Arturo Galindo, 2001. "Creditor Rights and the Credit Market: Where Do We Stand?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1348, Inter-American Development Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:brikps:1348
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pagano, Marco & Jappelli, Tullio, 1993. " Information Sharing in Credit Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1693-1718, December.
    2. Coco, Giuseppe, 2000. " On the Use of Collateral," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 191-214, April.
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    6. Barro, Robert J, 1976. "The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(4), pages 439-456, November.
    7. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    8. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    9. Manove, M. & Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: a Model of Lazy Banks," Papers 9807, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
    10. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, 1998. "The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics," NBER Working Papers 6472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Eduardo Lora & Patricia Cortés, 2001. "Los obstáculos al desarrollo empresarial y el tamaño de las firmas en América Latina," Research Department Publications 4258, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    12. Arturo Galindo & Alejandro Micco, 2001. "Creditor Protection and Financial Cycles," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1341, Inter-American Development Bank.
    13. Eduardo Lora & Patricia Cortés, 2001. "Los obstáculos al desarrollo empresarial y el tamaño de las firmas en América Latina," Research Department Publications 4258, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    14. Bernanke, Ben S & Blinder, Alan S, 1988. "Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 435-439, May.
    15. Kaufmann, Daniel & Kraay, Aart & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1999. "Aggregating governance indicators," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2195, The World Bank.
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    Cited by:

    1. Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Funchal, Bruno, 2006. "How much debtors' punishment?," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 615, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    2. Galina Hale & Assaf Razin & Hui Tong, 2006. "Institutional Weakness and Stock Price Volatility," NBER Working Papers 12127, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Suzanne Duryea & Carmen Pagés-Serra, 2002. "Políticas de capital humano: qué pueden conseguir y qué no en cuanto a la productividad y la reducción de la pobreza en América Latina," Research Department Publications 4298, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. World Bank, 2004. "Peru - Microeconomic Constraints to Growth: The Evidence from the Manufacturing Sector," World Bank Other Operational Studies 14426, The World Bank.
    5. Laeven, Luc & Majnoni, Giovanni, 2005. "Does judicial efficiency lower the cost of credit?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1791-1812, July.
    6. Suzanne Duryea & Carmen Pagés, 2002. "Human Capital Policies: What they Can and Cannot Do for Productivity and Poverty Reduction in Latin America," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1103, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. Anjali Kumar & Thorsten Beck & Cristine Campos & Soumya Chattopadhyay, 2005. "Assessing Financial Access in Brazil," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7452, June.
    8. Ana Carla Abrão Costa, 2004. "Sistemas Legais De Insolvência, Incentivos E Mercado De Crédito: Uma Abordagem Institucional," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 097, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    9. repec:eee:corfin:v:44:y:2017:i:c:p:255-274 is not listed on IDEAS

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