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Arreglos institucionales y desempeño fiscal: la experiencia latinoamericana

  • Ernesto H. Stein
  • Ernesto Talvi
  • Alejandro Grisanti

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza si los factores institucionales, en este caso los sistemas y procedimientos electorales, inciden en el desempeño fiscal de los países latinoamericanos según el tamaño del sector público, los déficit fiscales, el tamaño de la deuda oficial y el grado de propensión a los ciclos de la política fiscal. Los autores hallan que los sistemas electorales caracterizados por subdivisiones políticas de gran tamaño y una elevada fragmentación política tienen gobiernos y déficit más grandes, así como políticas fiscales más proclives a los ciclos. Por otro lado, los procedimientos presupuestarios transparentes y jerárquicos conducen a déficit y niveles de deuda más bajos.

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4111.

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Date of creation: Feb 1998
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4111
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  1. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Ricardo Hausmann & Alberto Alesina & Rudolf Hommes & Ernesto H. Stein, 1998. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Latin America," Research Department Publications 4160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  3. Barro, Robert J., 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Scholarly Articles 3451400, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. International Monetary Fund, 1996. "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline," IMF Working Papers 96/78, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann & Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 415-442, October.
  6. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March.
  7. Rodrik, Dani, 1996. "Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. James M. Poterba, 1996. "Do Budget Rules Work?," NBER Working Papers 5550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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