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Arreglos institucionales y desempeño fiscal: la experiencia latinoamericana


  • Ernesto H. Stein
  • Ernesto Talvi
  • Alejandro Grisanti


(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se analiza si los factores institucionales, en este caso los sistemas y procedimientos electorales, inciden en el desempeño fiscal de los países latinoamericanos según el tamaño del sector público, los déficit fiscales, el tamaño de la deuda oficial y el grado de propensión a los ciclos de la política fiscal. Los autores hallan que los sistemas electorales caracterizados por subdivisiones políticas de gran tamaño y una elevada fragmentación política tienen gobiernos y déficit más grandes, así como políticas fiscales más proclives a los ciclos. Por otro lado, los procedimientos presupuestarios transparentes y jerárquicos conducen a déficit y niveles de deuda más bajos.

Suggested Citation

  • Ernesto H. Stein & Ernesto Talvi & Alejandro Grisanti, 1998. "Arreglos institucionales y desempeño fiscal: la experiencia latinoamericana," Research Department Publications 4111, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4111

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
    2. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    4. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
    5. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann & Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 415-442, October.
    6. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March.
    7. James M. Poterba, 1996. "Do Budget Rules Work?," NBER Working Papers 5550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Hallerberg, Mark & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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