Inequality and Cost of Electoral Campaigns in Latin America
This article explores theoretic and empirically the effects of inequality on the cost of electoral campaigns. An electoral competition model suggests that electoral campaigns costs increase with the level of inequality. That result stresses the need of careful campaign financing regulation in highlyunequal Latin America. An econometric analysis of Brazilian 2002 and 2004 elections at the state and municipal levels confirms that result, especially for the municipal elections. Moreover, according to the empirical results, the lower the age dispersion and the higher the education dispersion of voters, the more expensive are the electoral campaigns.
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- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
- Adriana Cuocco Portuga & Mauricio Bugarin, 2007. "Electoral Campaign Financing: The Role of Public Contributions and Party Ideology," ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION, vol. 0(Fall 2007), pages 143-177, August.
- Portugal, Adriana C. & Bugarin, Maurício, 2007. "Electoral Campaign Financing: The role of public contributions and party ideology," Insper Working Papers wpe_102, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
- Roemer John E, 2006. "Party Competition under Private and Public Financing: A Comparison of Institutions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-31, April.
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