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Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model


  • Mauricio Soares Bugarin

    () (Department of Economics, University of Brasilia, Asa Norte, 70910-900, Brasilia, DF, Brazil)


This article presents a dynamic game theoretic model of voting in the presence of asymmetric information about a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world. Voters may use both vote splitting and reelection as mechanisms of electoral control. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, voters will reelect an Executive incumbent if a minimum level of social outcome, n*, is attained. The main findings are that voters tend to be more demanding, requiring a higher value for n*, if they expect the true state of the world to be favorable, and less demanding if they believe the state of the world is unfavorable. Moreover, vote splitting will be chosen if a favorable state is expected, whereas if an unfavorable state is more likely, voters reduce pressure over the incumbent by choosing a unified government.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauricio Soares Bugarin, 2003. "Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(1), pages 137-154.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:1:p:137-154
    Note: Received: 9 October 2000/Accepted: 11 February 2002

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    Cited by:

    1. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1011, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    2. Gomes, F. A. R. & Silva, C. G., 2007. "Measuring Unemployment Persistence of Different Labor Force Groups In the Greater Sao Paulo Metropolitan Area," Insper Working Papers wpe_71, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    3. Bugarin, Mauricio S., 2009. "Vote Splitting, Reelection and Electoral Control: Political Gridlocks, Ideology and the War on Terror," Insper Working Papers wpe_199, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.

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