Electoral Campaign Financing: The Role of Public Contributions and Party Ideology
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- Maurício Bugarin & Adriana Portugal & Sérgio Sakurai, 2008.
"Inequality and Cost of Electoral Campaigns in Latin America,"
08_14, Universidade de São Paulo, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto.
- Bugarin, Maurício & Portugal, Adriana & Sakurai, Sérgio, 2008. "Inequality and Cost of Electoral Campaigns in Latin America," Insper Working Papers wpe_152, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
More about this item
KeywordsPublic campaign financing; private political contributions; party ideology; electoral competition;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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