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Was spricht eigentlich gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung?

  • Lutz, Roman

    (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany])

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    "Ziel der Arbeit ist die bisher fehlende versicherungsökonomische Fundierung in der Argumentation über die Privatisierung der Arbeitslosenversicherung. Anders als in bisherigen Ansätzen werden die Begründungen gegen eine Privatisierung in eine versicherungstechnische und eine sozialpolitische Perspektive zerlegt. Hierdurch soll die häufig zu beobachtende Vermengung von objektiv-technischen und normativen Argumenten aufgebrochen werden. Im Ergebnis wird herausgearbeitet, dass letztlich nur das normative Argument der 'relativen Armut' gegen eine private Arbeitslosenversicherung spricht. Demnach ist die Belastungswirkung risikoäquivalenter Prämien für Personen mit hohem bis mittlerem Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko sozialpolitisch nicht vertretbar. Als wenig stichhaltig erweisen sich dagegen versicherungstechnische Argumente wie positive Korrelation der Einzelrisiken, Moral Hazard, unzureichende Prämiendifferenzierung sowie kollektive Unterschätzung des individuellen Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos. Als Lösung für das Problem der 'relativen Armut' wird ein neuer Entwurf zur Privatisierung der Arbeitslosenversicherung vorgestellt. Zentrales Element ist hierbei die kombinierte Versicherung von Arbeitslosigkeit und Langlebigkeit in einem Versicherungsprodukt." (Autorenreferat, IAB-Doku)

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    Paper provided by Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany] in its series IAB Discussion Paper with number 200624.

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    Length: 59 pages
    Date of creation: 28 Nov 2006
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: published in: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, Jg. 96, H. 2 (2007), p. 169-208
    Handle: RePEc:iab:iabdpa:200624
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