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Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard - a mechanism design approach

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  • Roland Strausz

Abstract

Crowdfunding challenges the traditional separation between nance and marketing. It creates economic value by reducing demand uncertainty, which enables a better screening of positive NPV projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this e ect. Using mechanism design, mechanisms are characterized that induce ecient screening, while preventing moral hazard. \All-ornothing" reward-crowdfunding platforms re ect salient features of these mechanisms. Eciency is sustainable only if expected gross returns exceed twice expected investment costs. Constrained ecient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. With limited consumer reach, crowdfunders become actual investors. Crowdfunding complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial nancing, because each nancing mode displays a di erent strength.

Suggested Citation

  • Roland Strausz, 2015. "Crowdfunding, demand uncertainty, and moral hazard - a mechanism design approach," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2015-036, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2015-036
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    File URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2015-036.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ajay Agrawal & Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, 2014. "Some Simple Economics of Crowdfunding," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-97.
    2. Raymond Deneckere & James Peck, 1995. "Competition Over Price and Service Rate When Demand is Stochastic: A Strategic Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 148-162, Spring.
    3. Ajay K. Agrawal & Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, 2011. "The Geography of Crowdfunding," NBER Working Papers 16820, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gilles Chemla & Katrin Tinn, 2020. "Learning Through Crowdfunding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1783-1801, May.
    2. Lars Hornuf & Matthias Schmitt, 2016. "Success and Failure in Equity Crowdfunding," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 14(2), pages 16-22, 07.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crowdfunding; nance; marketing; demand uncertainty; moral hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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