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Household Demand for Health Insurance: Price and Spouse's Coverage

  • Marjorie Honig

    ()

    (Hunter College, Department of Economics)

  • Irena Dushi

    (International Longevity Center-USA)

Registered author(s):

    Demand for employment-based insurance is typically treated as an individual rather than a household decision. Dual-earner households are now the modal U.S. married household, however, and most firms offer family coverage as an option available to employees. Findings from a model estimating married workers' take-up of their own insurance with their own and their spouses' offers indicate that both own price and potential coverage under spouses' plans are important determinants of take-up. We find evidence of selection into jobs offering insurance among wives but not husbands. Findings also suggest that dual-earners are not aware of the potential wage/benefit trade-off. Data are from the 1996 panel of SIPP.

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    File URL: http://econ.hunter.cuny.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/RePEc/papers/HunterEconWP411.pdf
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    Paper provided by Hunter College Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College with number 411.

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    Length: 33
    Date of creation: 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:411
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    Web page: http://econ.hunter.cuny.edu/

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    2. Robert S. Smith & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 1983. "Estimating Wage-Fringe Trade-Offs: Some Data Problems," NBER Chapters, in: The Measurement of Labor Cost, pages 347-370 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Royalty, Anne Beeson & Abraham, Jean M., 2006. "Health insurance and labor market outcomes: Joint decision-making within households," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1561-1577, September.
    4. Jonathan Gruber & Ebonya Washington, 2003. "Subsidies to Employee Health Insurance Premiums and the Health Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 9567, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Gruber, Jonathan, 1994. "The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 622-41, June.
    6. Gerald S. Goldstein & Mark V. Pauly, 1976. "Group Health Insurance as a Local Public Good," NBER Chapters, in: The Role of Health Insurance in the Health Services Sector, pages 73-114 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
    8. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    9. Paul Oyer, 2005. "Salary or Benefits?," NBER Working Papers 11817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages S11-S26, Part II, .
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    12. Helen Levy, 1998. "Who Pays for Health Insurance? Employee Contributions to Health Insurance Premiums," Working Papers 777, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    13. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
    14. Brown, Charles, 1980. "Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(1), pages 113-34, February.
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    16. Kate Bundorf, M., 2002. "Employee demand for health insurance and employer health plan choices," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 65-88, January.
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