Inflationary Finance and the Welfare Cost of Inflation
This paper applies previous theoretical and empirical results on inflation and demand for money to a study of inflationary finance and the welfare cost of inflation. The amount of revenue generated by a steady inflation is derived as a function of the inflation rate and some underlying parameters. Empirically, the revenue-maximizing rate is on the order of 140 percent per month with the corresponding revenue approximating 15 percent of national income. It is argued that hyper-inflations become unstable when the revenue-maximizing rate is exceeded. Because inflation leads to higher transaction costs (resulting from greater payment frequencies and reduced use of "money" as a payments medium), there is a net social cost attached to inflationary finance. The model implies that marginal collection costs of inflationary finance exceed 50 percent for all positive rates of inflation-hence, alternative means of raising revenue should be socially preferable. The analysis also provides estimates of the social gain from moving to the optimum quantity of money as 1-3 percent of income.
|Date of creation:||1972|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stein, Jerome L, 1970. "Monetary Growth Theory in Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 85-106, March.
- Feige, Edgar L & Parkin, Michael, 1971. "The Optimal Quantity of Money, Bonds, Commodity Inventories, and Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 335-49, June.
- Friedman, Milton, 1971. "Government Revenue from Inflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(4), pages 846-56, July-Aug..
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:3451393. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ben Steinberg)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.