Institutional Herding, Business Groups, and Economic Regimes: Evidence from Japan

To gain new and important insights into institutional herding, we study Japan for the following reasons: we can examine a market that is known for its active institutional investors, we can investigate the impacts of business grouping (i.e., the keiretsu), and we can see if herding and feedback trading behaviors differ under three distinct economic regimes (i.e., a regulated period, a bubble economy, and a bear market). We argue that the culture in Japan causes institutions to have both a long-term focus and close relationships with management. Consistent with the first view, we find that herding in Japan occurs on a lower level than it does in the U.S., and that the subsequent short-run returns to herding seem to be unimportant. Consistent with the second view, we find that when herding does occur, it has a large impact on price movements, and the use of past information (feedback trading) on herding behavior seems only marginally important. Much of these findings are more pronounced for keiretsu firms. Lastly, the effects and behavior of institutional herding is dependent on the economic environment.