A model of patent trolls
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- Silvana Krasteva & Huseyin Yildirim, 2012. "Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 514-536, September.
- Lauren Cohen & Umit Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, 2014. "Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms," NBER Working Papers 20322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Yi, Jong Goo, 1993. "The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 399-424, October.
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- Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, 2016.
"The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents,"
- Llobet, Gerard & Padilla, Atilano Jorge, 2016. "The Inverse Cournot Effect in Royalty Negotiations with Complementary Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 11624, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- repec:eee:indorg:v:56:y:2018:i:c:p:168-203 is not listed on IDEAS
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Keywordspatent portfolios; patent litigation; non-practicing entities; patent troll;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-10-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2015-10-10 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2015-10-10 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2015-10-10 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2015-10-10 (Law & Economics)
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