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Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations

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  • Silvana Krasteva
  • Huseyin Yildirim

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  • Silvana Krasteva & Huseyin Yildirim, 2012. "Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 514-536, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:43:y:2012:i:3:p:514-536
    DOI: j.1756-2171.2012.00184.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2018. "A Model Of Patent Trolls," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 2075-2106, November.
    2. Feng, Jiejian & Zhang, Michael, 2017. "Dynamic quotation of leadtime and price for a Make-To-Order system with multiple customer classes and perfect information on customer preferences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(1), pages 334-342.
    3. Chongvilaivan, Aekapol & Hur, Jung & Riyanto, Yohanes E., 2013. "Labor union bargaining and firm organizational structure," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 116-124.
    4. Maurya, Amit Kumar, 2018. "Bargaining order in multilateral bargaining with imperfect compliments," MPRA Paper 89583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Amit Kumar Maurya & Shubhro Sarkar, 2013. "Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with asymmetric sellers," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2013-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    6. Derek J. Clark & Jean-Christophe Pereau, 2021. "Group bargaining in supply chains," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(3), pages 111-138, September.
    7. Uyanik, Metin & Yengin, Duygu, 2023. "Expropriation power in private dealings: Quota rule in collective sales," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 548-580.
    8. Jiawei Li & Tianxiang Cui & Graham Kendall, 2022. "Equilibrium in a Bargaining Game of Two Sellers and Two Buyers," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(15), pages 1-9, July.
    9. Chen, Ying & Zápal, Jan, 2022. "Sequential vote buying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    10. Montez, João, 2014. "One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 249-265.
    11. Kos, Nenad & Auster, Sarah & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2019. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Proposal Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 13542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Gao, Hong & Xu, Haibo, 2021. "Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    13. Sarah Auster & Nenad Kos & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search For an Outside Offer," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_151v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    14. Mahendra Kumar Pallapothu & Gary Evans, 2013. "Gauging the Market and Non-Market Forces in Indian Aquaculture Industry for a Strategic Position in Fish Vaccines Market," Journal of Management and Strategy, Journal of Management and Strategy, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(1), pages 41-61, February.
    15. Sarah Auster & Nenad Kos & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Optimal pricing, private information and search for an outside offer," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 758-777, December.
    16. Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2023. "Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions," CIRANO Working Papers 2023s-13, CIRANO.
    17. Sarkar, Shubhro, 2016. "Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous sellers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-20.
    18. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 364-379.

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