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Bling Bling Taxation and the Fiscal Virtues of Hip Hop

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  • Engström, Per

    () (Department of Economics)

Abstract

The paper extends Ng’s (1987) model of optimal taxation of diamond goods — goods that are valued solely for their costliness. We extend his findings by analyzing how other goods should be taxed in the presence of pure diamond goods; modified Ramsey rules are derived in a basic single-type model as well as in a two-type model with redistribution. One key finding, that may be surprising and rather provoking, is that close complements (hip hop music) to diamond goods (bling bling) should be heavily subsidized.

Suggested Citation

  • Engström, Per, 2010. "Bling Bling Taxation and the Fiscal Virtues of Hip Hop," Working Paper Series 2010:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2010_012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. How to raise government revenue: tax bling bling, but subsidize hip hop?
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-09-16 19:30:00

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    1. repec:wsi:serxxx:v:59:y:2014:i:02:n:s021759081450009x is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal taxation; status; luxury taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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