Effects of Redistribution Policies - Who Gains and Who Loses?
The paper combines optimal taxation theory with human capital theory and develops a theoretical model with endogenous wages and education decision, in which redistributive policy experiments are carried out and assessed. It is argued that general equilibrium effects of labor income taxation on wages may counteract fiscal redistribution. It is also shown that education subsidies may only benefit skilled workers, suggesting that this subsidy can merely be viewed as a redistribution from unskilled to skilled individuals. Therefore, optimal policy involves a lump-sum education tax in the form of a negative education subsidy.
|Date of creation:||27 Jun 2007|
|Date of revision:|
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"Optimal Tax and Education Policy When Agents Differ in Altruism and Productivity,"
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653, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
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- Philip Trostel & Ian Walker, 2006.
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- Trostel, P. & Walker, I., 2000. "Education and Work," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 554, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- William Blankenau, 1999. "A Welfare Analysis of Policy Responses to the Skilled Wage Premium," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 2(4), pages 820-849, October.
- Allen, Franklin, 1982. "Optimal linear income taxation with general equilibrium effects on wages," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 135-143, March.
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