Market Delineation and Product Differentiation
The purpose of this study is to analyse theoretically the implications of applying the procedure for market delineation used by competitions authorities in the EU and in the US. Specifically, we investigate the circumstances under which the procedure will lead to positive relation between actual market power and the assessed degree of market dominance. Another objective is to test whether the procedure is neutral in the sense that it does not discriminate among different sources of market power. In order to address these issues, we develop an oligopoly model that allows for an arbitrary number of firms as well as for vertical an horizontal product differentiation. It is found that the correlation between actual market power and assessed market dominance is likely to be weak and that the procedure discriminates strongly among different sources of market power.
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|Date of creation:||13 Sep 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2001, pages 81-99.|
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- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
- Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M, 1994. "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 407-26, October.
- Froeb, L.M. & Werden, G.J., 1991. "Correlation, Causality, and all that Jazz: The Inherent Shortcomings of Price Tests for Antitrust Market Delineation," Papers 91-6, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Baker, Jonathan B & Baresnahan, Timothy F, 1985. "The Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-differentiated Industries," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 427-44, June.
- Anderson, Simon P & De Palma, Andre, 1992. "The Logit as a Model of Product Differentiation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 51-67, January.
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