Vertical Integration and Competition Policy
The European Commission has decided to implement a simplified procedure in the context of vertical integration. If the combined market shares of the merging firms is higher than 25 percent the Commission will investigate the merger thoroughly. Otherwise, the merger is considered harmless. The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare aspects of vertical integration in a simple model and investigate the accuracy of the proposed rule of thumb. Mergers turn out to be harmless from a social point of view when the upstream market is relatively less concentrated compared to the downstream market. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 24 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/industrial+organization/journal/11149/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Riordan, Michael H, 1998.
"Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1232-1248, December.
- Michael Riordan, 1996. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," Papers 0064, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Riordan, M.H., 1996. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," Papers 64, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Hackner, Jonas, 2000. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August.
- Häckner, Jonas, 1999. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Research Papers in Economics 1999:9, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)