Vertical Integration and Competition Policy
The European Commission has decided to implement a simplified procedure in the context of vertical integration. If the combined market shares of the merging firms is higher than 25 percent the Commission will investigate the merger thoroughly. Otherwise, the merger is considered harmless. The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare aspects of vertical integration in a simple model and investigate the accuracy of the proposed rule of thumb. Mergers turn out to be harmless from a social point of view when the upstream market is relatively less concentrated compared to the downstream market. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Riordan, 1996.
"Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm,"
0064, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Riordan, Michael H, 1998. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1232-48, December.
- Riordan, M.H., 1996. "Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm," Papers 64, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March.
- Häckner, Jonas, 1999.
"A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies,"
Research Papers in Economics
1999:9, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Hackner, Jonas, 2000. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August.
- Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:24:y:2003:i:2:p:213-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.