The dominant Law and Economics paradigm regarding “Intellectual Property" – a vehicle or an obstacle for innovation, growth and progress?
The term "intellectual property" is a relatively a modern term, first used in its current meaning when the UN established the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1967. Beforehand laws around the world protected various aspects of informational goods - inventions and creations - using separate legal concepts, such as copyright, patents and trademarks, which were not perceived as property rights. This linguistic aspect is by no means anecdotal or marginal as it can be argued that the term "intellectual property" constituted its contemporary meaning including the economic analysis of informational goods and services, as can be demonstrated by the recent call to treat trade secrets not as a contractual agreement but as intellectual property (Epstein, 2005). This paper focuses on the normative analysis of IP rights and criticizes the implicit shift in economic analysis of IP from the incentives paradigm, which is founded upon the public good analysis of neo-classical micro-economic theory, to the new propriety paradigm, which is intellectually founded upon the tragedy of the commons literature. It further criticizes the dominant contemporary Law and Economics writings in this field as pre-assuming information to be an object of property, overlooking its fundamental differences from physical property and thus focusing on its management and maximization of value for its "owners" rather than on its initial justifications and its social value and contribution to innovation, growth and progress.
|Date of creation:||27 Sep 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden|
Phone: 08-441 59 00
Fax: 08-441 59 29
Web page: http://www.ratio.se/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 325-63, June.
- Frischmann Brett M., 2007. "Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(3), pages 649-677, December.
- Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000.
"Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not),"
NBER Working Papers
7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wesley M Cohen & Richard R Nelson & John P Walsh, 2003. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not)," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000624, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Pakes, 1984.
"Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks,"
NBER Working Papers
1340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pakes, Ariel S, 1986. "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 755-84, July.
- Boldrin,Michele & Levine,David K., 2010.
"Against Intellectual Monopoly,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521127264.
- Mark A Lemley, 2004. "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000492, David K. Levine.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0177. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin Korpi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.