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Genetic testing and repulsion from chance

  • Hoel, Michael

    ()

    (Department of Economics)

  • Nilssen, Tore

    ()

    (Department of Economics)

  • Vislie, Jon

    (Department of Economics)

  • Iversen, Tor

    ()

    (Institute of Health Management and Health Economics)

A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. This issue is analysed within a model with the following important feature: A person's well-being depends on the perceived probability of becoming ill in the future in a way that varies among individuals. The authors show that both tested high-risks and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by insurers. Individuals who test for being low-risks, on the other hand, are made worse off by not being able to verify this to insurers. This implies that verifiability dominates non-verifiability in an ex-ante sense.

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File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2002/HERO2002_10.pdf
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2002:10.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 29 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2002_010
Contact details of provider: Postal: HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 2307 5309
Fax: 2307 5310
Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
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  1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  2. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
  3. Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor, 2002. "Genetic testing when there is a mix of compulsory and voluntary health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 253-270, March.
  4. Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi & Polak, Ben, 1998. "Intrinsic Preference for Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 233-259, December.
  5. Hoy, Michael & Polborn, Mattias, 2000. "The value of genetic information in the life insurance market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 235-252, November.
  6. Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December.
  7. David M Kreps & Evan L Porteus, 1978. "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000009, David K. Levine.
  8. Kuehn, Astrid & Wambach, Achim, 2001. "Breakdown of Will and the Value of Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3111, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Chew, Soo Hong & Ho, Joanna L, 1994. "Hope: An Empirical Study of Attitude toward the Timing of Uncertainty Resolution," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 267-88, May.
  10. Marie-Cécile FAGART & Bidénam KAMBIA-CHOPIN, 2006. "Prevention in insurance markets," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 82, pages 55-70.
  11. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
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