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Self-Insurance With Genetic Testing Tools

Author

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  • David Crainich

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - ULCO - Université du Littoral Côte d'Opale - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The development of genetic testing creates opportunities to better target disease prevention actions. In this article, we determine how the genetic information modifies self-insurance efforts in different health insurance market equilibria with adverse selection. We show that a regulation prohibiting insurers from using genetic information for rate-making purposes: (1) cancels the benefits of genetic testing when pooling equilibria occur and (2) does not prevent the exploitation of the benefits derived from genetic testing when separating equilibria (both of the Rothschild-Stiglitz or of the Miyazaki-Spence type) prevail in insurance markets.

Suggested Citation

  • David Crainich, 2015. "Self-Insurance With Genetic Testing Tools," Post-Print hal-01533549, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01533549
    DOI: 10.1111/jori.12085
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    Cited by:

    1. David Bardey & Philippe De Donder, 2025. "A welfare analysis of genetic testing in health insurance markets with adverse selection and prevention," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(2), pages 443-483, May.
    2. Schernberg, Hélène, 2025. "Social genetic insurance: A life-cycle perspective," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    3. Posey, Lisa L. & Thistle, Paul D., 2021. "Genetic testing and genetic discrimination: Public policy when insurance becomes “too expensive”," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    4. Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe & Mantilla, César, 2019. "How is the trade-off between adverse selection and discrimination risk affected by genetic testing? Theory and experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    5. Bardey, David & De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 768-779.
    6. Christine Arentz, 2012. "Auswirkungen von Gentests in der Krankenversicherung," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 04/2012, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    7. David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & CÔøΩsar Mantilla, 2014. "Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach," Documentos CEDE 12341, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    8. Martin Eling & Irina Gemmo & Danjela Guxha & Hato Schmeiser, 2024. "Big data, risk classification, and privacy in insurance markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 49(1), pages 75-126, March.
    9. Maik Dehnert, 2020. "Sustaining the current or pursuing the new: incumbent digital transformation strategies in the financial service industry," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 13(3), pages 1071-1113, November.
    10. François Pannequin & Anne Corcos, 2023. "Risk Management and Public Policies: How prevention challenges monopolistic insurance markets," Documents de recherche 23-02, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
    11. David Crainich, 2024. "Optimal self‐insurance with genetic testing and state‐dependent utility," Post-Print hal-04864674, HAL.
    12. David Bardey & Philippe De Donder, 2015. "Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?," Documentos CEDE 17220, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    13. Peter, Richard & Richter, Andreas & Thistle, Paul, 2017. "Endogenous information, adverse selection, and prevention: Implications for genetic testing policy," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 95-107.
    14. Stefan Felder, 2022. "Decision thresholds with genetic testing," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 23(6), pages 1071-1078, August.

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