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Keep on Fighting: Dynamic Win Effects in an All-Pay Auction

Author

Listed:
  • Clark, Derek J.

    (School of Business and Economics)

  • Nilssen , Tore

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Sand, Jan Yngve

    (School of Business and Economics)

Abstract

We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant.s present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage affects contestants.efforts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on fighting are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the laggard will always be higher than the rival at some stage in the series of contests, and this is most likely to happen when at a large disadvantage or at a late stage in the series.

Suggested Citation

  • Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen , Tore & Sand, Jan Yngve, 2014. "Keep on Fighting: Dynamic Win Effects in an All-Pay Auction," Memorandum 23/2014, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2014_023
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kai A Konrad, 2018. "Budget and Effort Choice in Sequential Colonel Blotto Campaigns," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(4), pages 555-576.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    win advantage; motivation; contest; discouragement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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