Free-riding on Communication: An Experimental Study
This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects tend to wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free. Thirdly, the form of communication also strongly suggests free-riding.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2010|
|Date of revision:||03 Mar 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden|
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- Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
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- Andersson, Ola & Holm, Håkan J., 2010.
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- Andersson, Ola & Carlsson, Hans & Holm, Håkan, 2006. "Endogenous Communication and Tacit Coordination in Market Entry Games - An explorative experimental study," Working Papers 2006:12, Lund University, Department of Economics.
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- R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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