IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Fairness and Promises for Sale

  • Holm, Håkan


    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Daielson, Anders

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

While many studies have shown that fairness matters few efforts have been made to find out how important fairness is to the individual and thereby assessing the limits of these fairness concerns. This study reports on Trust game experiments in Sweden and Jamaica where subjects could forego a more fair allocation in return for extra money. The results indicate that 90 percent of subjects that had demonstrated fairness ambitions were willing to let down their counterparts if compensated. Explicit promises did not seem to matter. The first player was informed that the second player could earn extra money by changing to an unfair allocation. This modification appeared to make the trust aspect more salient which can explain a relatively strong consistency between trust behavior and answers to attitudinal trust questions.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004:18.

in new window

Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: 22 Jun 2004
Date of revision: 15 Aug 2005
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2004_018
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Camerer, Colin F & Hogarth, Robin M, 1999. "The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 19(1-3), pages 7-42, December.
  2. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
  3. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec..
  5. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  6. Danielson, Anders & Holm, Hakan J, 2003. "Tropic Trust versus Nordic Trust: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania and Sweden," Working Papers 2003:6, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  7. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
  8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
  9. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June.
  10. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
  11. Holm, Håkan & Nystedt, Paul, 2002. "Intra-Generational Trust - a Semi-Experimental Study of Trust Among Different Generations," Working Papers 2002:16, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  12. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:114:y:1999:i:3:p:817-868 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. James Konow, 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1188-1239, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2004_018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Edgerton)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.