Politically Correct Information Adoption
This paper analyses the case when the political struggle not is channeled through policy choices, but through what information to adopt. The paper presents a simple model to analyze collective decisions of adopting new information when different parties' payoffs are contingent upon the new information. In equilibrium we demonstrate that the adopted information is biased towards “political correctness” rather than being informative (in the Blackwell sense). These results may be relevant when designing decision mechanisms for institutions that are to be keen on new information.
|Date of creation:||28 Jul 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden|
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lohmann, Susanne, 1994. "Information Aggregation through Costly Political Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 518-30, June.
- Holm, Hakan J., 1997. "Genetic information and investment in human capital," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 435-452, August.
- Matthew Rabin., 1991.
"Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change,"
Economics Working Papers
91-180, University of California at Berkeley.
- Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 581-593.
- Bassan, Bruno & Scarsini, Marco, 1995.
"On the value of information in multi-agent decision theory,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 557-576.
- Marco Scarsini & Bruno Bassan, 1995. "On the value of information in multi-agent decision theory," Post-Print hal-00541811, HAL.
- Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-19, June.
- Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February.
- Gilad, Benjamin & Kaish, Stanley & Loeb, Peter D., 1987. "Cognitive dissonance and utility maximization : A general framework," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 61-73, March.
- Goeran Skogh, 1999. "Risk-Sharing Institutions for Unpredictable Losses," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(3), pages 505-, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2000_005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Edgerton)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.