Politically Correct Information Adoption
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsInformativeness; Majority Rule; Political Correctness;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-09-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2000-09-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2000-09-01 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2000-09-01 (Positive Political Economics)
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