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Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?

Author

Listed:
  • Boom, Anette

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Schwenen, Sebastian

    (DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research)

Abstract

We examine welfare e ffects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.

Suggested Citation

  • Boom, Anette & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2013. "Real-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?," Working Papers 01-2013, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2013_001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert H. Patrick & Frank A. Wolak, 2001. "Estimating the Customer-Level Demand for Electricity Under Real-Time Market Prices," NBER Working Papers 8213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chloé Coq & Henrik Orzen & Sebastian Schwenen, 2017. "Pricing and capacity provision in electricity markets: an experimental study," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 123-158, April.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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