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No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in ethical judgments

Author

Listed:
  • Francesca Gino

    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Don A. Moore

    (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Max H. Bazerman

    (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit)

Abstract

We present six studies demonstrating that outcome information biases ethical judgments of others' ethically-questionable behaviors. In particular, we show that the same behaviors produce more ethical condemnation when they happen to produce bad rather than good outcomes, even if the outcomes are determined by chance. Our studies show that individuals judge behaviors as less ethical, more blameworthy, and punish them more harshly, when such behaviors led to undesirable consequences, even if they saw those behaviors as acceptable before they knew its consequences. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that a rational, analytic mindset can override the effects of one's intuitions in ethical judgments. Implications for both research and practice are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Gino & Don A. Moore & Max H. Bazerman, 2008. "No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in ethical judgments," Harvard Business School Working Papers 08-080, Harvard Business School, revised Apr 2009.
    • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:08-080
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    File URL: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-080.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hershey, John C. & Baron, Jonathan, 1992. "Judgment by outcomes: When is it justified?," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 89-93, October.
    2. Camerer, Colin & Loewenstein, George & Weber, Martin, 1989. "The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1232-1254, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Savani, Krishna & King, Dan, 2015. "Perceiving outcomes as determined by external forces: The role of event construal in attenuating the outcome bias," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 136-146.
    2. Cubitt, Robin P. & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gächter, Simon & Kabalin, Ruslan, 2011. "Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 253-264.
    3. Cubitt, Robin P. & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gächter, Simon & Kabalin, Ruslan, 2011. "Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 253-264.
    4. Nils Köbis & Jean-François Bonnefon & Iyad Rahwan, 2021. "Bad machines corrupt good morals," Nature Human Behaviour, Nature, vol. 5(6), pages 679-685, June.
    5. Helzer, Erik G. & Rosenzweig, Emily, 2020. "Examining the role of harm-to-others in lay perceptions of greed," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 106-114.
    6. Oliver Merz & Raphael Flepp & Egon Franck, 2021. "Underestimating randomness: Outcome bias in betting exchange markets," Working Papers 390, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW).
    7. Kausel, Edgar E. & Ventura, Santiago & Rodríguez, Arturo, 2019. "Outcome bias in subjective ratings of performance: Evidence from the (football) field," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 75(PB).
    8. Philippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde & Gideon Keren & Marcel Zeelenberg, 2013. "The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 8(2), pages 161-173, March.
    9. Silver, Ike & Silverman, Jackie, 2022. "Doing good for (maybe) nothing: How reward uncertainty shapes observer responses to prosocial behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    10. Robin Maialeh, 2019. "Generalization of results and neoclassical rationality: unresolved controversies of behavioural economics methodology," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1743-1761, July.
    11. Ilaria Castelli & Davide Massaro & Cristina Bicchieri & Alex Chavez & Antonella Marchetti, 2014. "Fairness Norms and Theory of Mind in an Ultimatum Game: Judgments, Offers, and Decisions in School-Aged Children," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(8), pages 1-10, August.
    12. Justin W Martin & Fiery Cushman, 2015. "To Punish or to Leave: Distinct Cognitive Processes Underlie Partner Control and Partner Choice Behaviors," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, April.
    13. Brownback, Andy & Kuhn, Michael A., 2019. "Understanding outcome bias," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 342-360.
    14. Gino, Francesca & Shu, Lisa L. & Bazerman, Max H., 2010. "Nameless + harmless = blameless: When seemingly irrelevant factors influence judgment of (un)ethical behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 93-101, March.

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