The economics of Bitcoin transaction fees
We study the economics of Bitcoin transaction fees in a simple static partial equilibrium model with the specificity that the system security is directly linked to the total computational power of miners. We show that any situation with a fixed fee is equivalent to another situation with a limited block size. In both cases, we give the optimal value of the transaction fee or of the block size. We also show that making the block size a non binding constraint and, in the same time, letting the fee be fixed as the outcome of a decentralized competitive market cannot guarantee the very existence of Bitcoin in the long-term.
|Date of creation:||24 Feb 2014|
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|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00951358|
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- Fumiko Hayashi & William R. Keeton, 2012. "Measuring the costs of retail payment methods," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II.
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