IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-00995799.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Analysis of the Investment Decisions on the European Electricity Markets, over the 1945-2013 Period

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal da Costa

    (LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - EA 2606 - CentraleSupélec)

  • Bianka Shoai Tehrani

    (LGI - Laboratoire Génie Industriel - EA 2606 - CentraleSupélec, TECH ECO (ex-ITESE) - Institut Technico-Economie - CEA-DES (ex-DEN) - CEA-Direction des Energies (ex-Direction de l'Energie Nucléaire) - CEA - Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives - Université Paris-Saclay)

Abstract

The aim of the article is to understand how the drivers for investment decisions in the capacities of electricity production have evolved over time, from 1945 to the present day, in the specific context of Europe facing wars and conflicts, scientific and technological progress, strong political and academic developments. We study the electric investment decisions by comparing the history of the European electricity markets with the successively dominant economic theories in this field. Therefore, we highlight differences between rational behaviors, such as described by the theories, and actual behaviors of investors and governments. Thus the liberalization of electricity markets in the European Union, more than twenty-five years ago, parts of a rationalization prescribed by new economic theories. It is clear that liberalization is being discussed. First, it remains very heterogeneous, which complicates the goal of creating a large single market for electricity in the Union. Second, we see a recent re-centralization of energy policy in the European Union (EU), which takes the form of a new regulation mainly relating to climate and renewables. However, this re-regulation is different from centralized control experienced by all European electricity markets until the mid-1980s.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal da Costa & Bianka Shoai Tehrani, 2013. "An Analysis of the Investment Decisions on the European Electricity Markets, over the 1945-2013 Period," Working Papers hal-00995799, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00995799
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00995799
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-00995799/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sharkey,William W., 1983. "The Theory of Natural Monopoly," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521271943, January.
    2. Newbery, David M., 1997. "Privatisation and liberalisation of network utilities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 357-383, April.
    3. George Eads, 1971. "A.E. Kahn: The Economics of Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(2), pages 678-682, Autumn.
    4. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    5. Burton A. Weisbrod, 1964. "Collective-Consumption Services of Individual-Consumption Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 471-477.
    6. Anne Perrot, 2002. "Les frontières entre régulation sectorielle et politique de la concurrence," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 16(4), pages 81-112.
    7. Stern,Nicholas, 2007. "The Economics of Climate Change," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521700801, January.
    8. Martin Chick, 2007. "Electricity and Energy Policy in Britain, France and the United States since 1945," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3650.
    9. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Christopher R. Knittel, 1999. "Market Power in Electricity Markets: Beyond Concentration Measures," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 65-88.
    10. Baumol, William J, 1977. "On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(5), pages 809-822, December.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    12. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 655-661, September.
    13. Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, 1948. "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 279-279.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wenhui Tian & Pascal da Costa & Jean-Claude Bocquet, 2015. "Inequalities of Sectors CO 2 emissions in China, USA and France, 2010-2050," Working Papers hal-01219769, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bianka Shoai Tehrani & Pascal Da Costa & Danièle Attias, 2014. "Three Investment Scenarios for Future Nuclear Reactors in Europe," Working Papers hal-00997005, HAL.
    2. Bianka Shoai Tehrani & Pascal da Costa & Danièle Attias, 2016. "Three investment scenarios for future nuclear reactors in Europe," Post-Print hal-00997005, HAL.
    3. Gencer, Busra & Larsen, Erik Reimer & van Ackere, Ann, 2020. "Understanding the coevolution of electricity markets and regulation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    4. Andersson, Tommy, 2004. "Essays on Nonlinear Pricing and Welfare," MPRA Paper 59446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Richard Tol, 2011. "Regulating knowledge monopolies: the case of the IPCC," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 108(4), pages 827-839, October.
    6. Çetin, Tamer & Yasin Eryigit, Kadir, 2013. "The economic effects of government regulation: Evidence from the New York taxicab market," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 169-177.
    7. Massey, Patrick, 2004. "Is Irish Utility Regulation Failing Consumers?," Quarterly Economic Commentary: Special Articles, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), vol. 2004(4-Winter), pages 1-18.
    8. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, daniel, 2000. ""Seize the state, seize the day": state capture, corruption, and influence in transition," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2444, The World Bank.
    9. Peeter Peda & Giuseppe Grossi & Margo Liik, 2013. "Do ownership and size affect the performance of water utilities? Evidence from Estonian municipalities," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(2), pages 237-259, May.
    10. Özge .Ic{s}legen & Stefan Reichelstein, 2011. "Carbon Capture by Fossil Fuel Power Plants: An Economic Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(1), pages 21-39, January.
    11. Olga Chiappinelli & Karsten Neuhoff, 2020. "Time-Consistent Carbon Pricing: The Role of Carbon Contracts for Differences," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1859, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Eduardo Saavedra, "undated". "Alternative Institutional Arrangements in Network Utilities: An Incomplete Contracting Approach," ILADES-UAH Working Papers inv116, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business.
    13. Tsur, Yacov & de Gorter, Harry, 2012. "Dynamic regulation of nonpoint source pollution when the number of emitters is large," Discussion Papers 122124, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
    14. David Martimort & Stéphane Straub, 2016. "How To Design Infrastructure Contracts In A Warming World: A Critical Appraisal Of Public–Private Partnerships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57, pages 61-88, February.
    15. Eugenio J. Miravete & Katja Seim & Jeff Thurk, 2020. "One Markup to Rule Them All: Taxation by Liquor Pricing Regulation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-41, February.
    16. Felix Höffler & Sebastian Kranz, 2015. "Using Forward Contracts to Reduce Regulatory Capture," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 598-624, December.
    17. Gustavo Ferro & Omar O. Chisari, 2010. "Tópicos de Economía de la Regulación de los Servicios Públicos," Working Papers hal-00473038, HAL.
    18. Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2011. "A General Framework for Regulation and Liberalization in Network Industries," Chapters, in: Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Upadhyaya, Kamal P. & Raymond, Jeannie E. & Mixon, Franklin Jr., 1997. "The economic theory of regulation versus alternative theories for the electric utilities industry: A simultaneous probit model," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-202, August.
    20. Helen Scarborough & Jeff Bennett, 2012. "Cost–Benefit Analysis and Distributional Preferences," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14376.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Electricity Market; Electricity Investments; European Energy Market Liberalisation; Climatic issues; Renewables.; Renewables;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00995799. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.