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Certification of Origin as a Non-Tariff Barrier


  • Claire Chambolle

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Eric Giraud-Héraud

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


This paper put forward the opinion that the certification of origin constitutes another type ofnon-tariff barrier. Indeed, certification of origin often combines both a quantity restriction anda sort of quality cost subsidy. We consider the canonical model of strategic trade policy,whereby two firms are located respectively in the home country and in a foreign country andare competing on the domestic market. In this framework, we show how certification canallow the domestic firm to position itself as a high quality producer. If, however, the certifiedfirm offers the low quality good, then consumers' surplus may be improved.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire Chambolle & Eric Giraud-Héraud, 2004. "Certification of Origin as a Non-Tariff Barrier," Working Papers hal-00242917, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242917
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Motta, Massimo, 1993. "Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 113-131, June.
    2. Analysis, A Welfare & Das, Satya P. & Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1987. "Trade policy and its impact on quality of imports," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 77-95, August.
    3. Herguera, Inigo & Kujal, Praveen & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2000. "Quantity restrictions and endogenous quality choice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(8), pages 1259-1277, December.
    4. Krishna, Kala, 1990. "Protection and the Product Line: Monopoly and Product Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 87-102, February.
    5. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
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    Cited by:

    1. Caracciolo, Francesco & D’Amico, Mario & Di Vita, Giuseppe & Pomarici, Eugenio & Dal Bianco, Andrea & Cembalo, Luigi, 2016. "Private vs. Collective Wine Reputation," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IFAMA), vol. 19(3).
    2. Marion Desquilbet & Sylvette Monier-Dilhan, 2015. "Are geographical indications a worthy quality label? A framework with endogenous quality choice," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 42(1), pages 129-150.
    3. Patricia Crifo & Vanina D. Forget, 2015. "The Economics Of Corporate Social Responsibility: A Firm-Level Perspective Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 112-130, February.
    4. Anders, Sven M. & Caswell, Julie A., 2009. "The Benefits and Costs of Proliferation of Geographical Labeling for Developing Countries," Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, Estey Centre for Law and Economics in International Trade, vol. 10(1).
    5. Raimondi, Valentina & Falco, Chiara & Curzi, Daniele & Olper, Alessandro, 2016. "Estimating the trade effects of the EU food quality policy," 149th Seminar, October 27-28, 2016, Rennes, France 244795, European Association of Agricultural Economists.


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