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The redistributive preferences of the well-off

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  • Elvire Guillaud

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LIEPP - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Michaël Zemmour

    (CLERSÉ - Centre Lillois d’Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques - UMR 8019 - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We argue that the structure of inequality (not only its level) has an impact on redistributive preferences. We test this argument on the well-off, as they stand in a pivotal position between households that have a reduced capacity to contribute to taxation due to limitied labour income, and households with greater facility to achieve fiscal optimization thanks to capital income. Inequality is measured at different locations of the income distribution, nearby the income position of the well-off. Attitudes are measured through ISSP international survey, fielded from 1985 to 2006 across 19 countries. Consistent with Albert Hirschman's 'tunnel effect', our results show that support for redistribution amongst the well-off is conditioned by their prospect of mobility in both directions, proxied by the change in inequality next to them. Support amongst the well-off increases when their expected cost of downgrading rises, while it decreases when top incomes move further away in the income distribution.

Suggested Citation

  • Elvire Guillaud & Michaël Zemmour, 2017. "The redistributive preferences of the well-off," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) halshs-01652706, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-01652706
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01652706v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John Micklewright & Sylke V. Schnepf, 2010. "How reliable are income data collected with a single question?," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 173(2), pages 409-429, April.
    2. Elvire Guillaud, 2013. "Preferences for redistribution: an empirical analysis over 33 countries," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 11(1), pages 57-78, March.
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    Cited by:

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