Until Death Do Us Part? The economics of short-term marriage contracts
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- Stefania Marcassa & Grégory Ponthière, 2014. "Until Death Do Us Part?: The Economics of Short-Term Marriage Contracts," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01053606, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- O Blanchard & A Landier, 2002. "The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: fixed--Term Contracts in France," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 214-244, June.
- Hamilton, Gillian, 1999. "Property Rights and Transaction Costs in Marriage: Evidence from Prenuptial Contracts," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(01), pages 68-103, March.
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Keywordsmarriage contracts; collective household model; length of marriage; household production technology;
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