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Le " Corporate Control " Et Le Risque Actionnarial : Une Revue De La Litterature

Author

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  • Agnes Nabet

    (DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

La théorie de l'agence présente le manager comme un acteur opportuniste et le risque actionnarial comme étant illimité. Notre article se situe dans une perspective inverse puisqu'il tente de montrer que les mécanismes classiques de " corporate control " peuvent devenir des outils de gestion du risque actionnarial (qui devient limité).

Suggested Citation

  • Agnes Nabet, 2000. "Le " Corporate Control " Et Le Risque Actionnarial : Une Revue De La Litterature," Post-Print halshs-00587491, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00587491
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00587491
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    References listed on IDEAS

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