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Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores

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  • Aymeric Lardon

    () (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this article we study interval games in oligopolies following the γ-approach. First, we analyze their non-cooperative foundation and show that each coalition is associated with an endogenous real interval. Second, the Hurwicz criterion turns out to be a key concept to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of each of the induced core solution concepts: the interval and the standard γ-cores. The first condition permits to ascertain that even for linear and symmetric industries the interval γ-core is empty. Moreover, by means of the approximation technique of quadratic Bézier curves we prove that the second condition always holds, hence the standard γ-core is non-empty, under natural properties of profit and cost functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Aymeric Lardon, 2016. "Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores," Post-Print halshs-00544044, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00544044
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2211-7
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00544044
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    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00544044/document
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    Cited by:

    1. Theo Driessen & Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon, 2011. "Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual game," Working Papers halshs-00610840, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Quadratic Bézier curve; Hurwicz criterion; γ-Cores; Interval game; Oligopoly;

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