Endogenous interval games in oligopolies and the cores
In this article we study interval games in oligopolies following the γ-approach. First, we analyze their non-cooperative foundation and show that each coalition is associated with an endogenous real interval. Second, the Hurwicz criterion turns out to be a key concept to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of each of the induced core solution concepts: the interval and the standard γ-cores. The first condition permits to ascertain that even for linear and symmetric industries the interval γ-core is empty. Moreover, by means of the approximation technique of quadratic Bézier curves we prove that the second condition always holds, hence the standard γ-core is non-empty, under natural properties of profit and cost functions.
|Date of creation:||29 Apr 2016|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Annals of Operations Research, Springer Verlag, 2016, <10.1007/s10479-016-2211-7>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00544044|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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