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Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies


  • Norde, Henk
  • Pham Do, Kim Hang
  • Tijs, Stef


In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies.From a cooperative point of view this leads to two different classes of cooperative games.We show that cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly games with transferable are totally balanced, but not necessarily convex.
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  • Norde, Henk & Pham Do, Kim Hang & Tijs, Stef, 2002. "Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 187-207, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:187-207

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Zhao, Jingang, 1999. "A necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity in oligopoly games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, March.
    2. Meinhardt, Holger, 1999. " Common Pool Games Are Convex Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(2), pages 247-270.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kumoi, Yuki & Matsubayashi, Nobuo, 2014. "Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: Stability and fair profit allocation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(1), pages 221-232.
    2. Do, Kim Hang Pham & Folmer, Henk & Norde, Henk, 2006. "Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31964, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    3. Pham Do, K.H. & Folmer, H. & Norde, H.W., 2001. "Transboundary Fishery Management : A Game Theoretic Approach," Discussion Paper 2001-17, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    4. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2016. "Optimal Deterrence of Cooperation," GREDEG Working Papers 2016-22, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis, revised Jun 2017.
    5. Aymeric Lardon, 2017. "On the Coalitional Stability of Monopoly Power in Differentiated Bertrand and Cournot Oligopolies," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-10, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    6. repec:spr:annopr:v:248:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-016-2211-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Pham Do, K.H. & Folmer, H., 2003. "International Fisheries Agreements : The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation," Discussion Paper 2003-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Aymeric Lardon, 2012. "The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 387-411, March.
    9. Theo Driessen & Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon, 2011. "Stackelberg oligopoly TU-games: characterization of the core and 1-concavity of the dual game," Working Papers halshs-00610840, HAL.
    10. Aymeric Lardon, 2014. "A partial characterization of the core in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with transferable technologies," Working Papers hal-01081803, HAL.
    11. Dongshuang Hou & Theo Driessen & Aymeric Lardon, 2011. "Convexity and the Shapley value in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with Shubik's demand functions," Working Papers halshs-00610838, HAL.
    12. Driessen, Theo S.H. & Meinhardt, Holger I., 2005. "Convexity of oligopoly games without transferable technologies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 102-126, July.
    13. repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:19:y:2017:i:04:n:s0219198917500207 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Paraskevas Lekeas & Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2016. "Cooperative Games with Externalities and Probabilistic Coalitional Beliefs," Working Papers 1605, University of Crete, Department of Economics.

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