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The cooperative analysis of oligopoly TU markets with infinitely many firms

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  • Zhe Yang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
    Ministry of Education)

Abstract

Our paper develops the work of cooperative oligopoly TU markets. Inspired by Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28(1):25–34, 1999) and Zhao (Games Econ Behav 27(1):153–168, 1999), our paper investigates the TU stable profit allocations of cooperative oligopoly TU markets with countably many firms. We first show that the set of $$\alpha -$$ α - TU stable profit allocations coincides with the set of $$\beta -$$ β - TU stable profit allocations. Furthermore, under some regular conditions, we shall prove the existence theorem of $$\alpha -$$ α - TU stable profit allocations for oligopoly TU markets with countably many firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhe Yang, 2025. "The cooperative analysis of oligopoly TU markets with infinitely many firms," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 345(1), pages 517-532, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:345:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-024-06392-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-024-06392-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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