An Interdisciplinary Approach to Coalition Formation
A stable government is by deﬁnition not dominated by any other government. However, it may happen that all governments are dominated. In graph-theoretic terms this means that the dominance graph does not possess a source. In this paper we are able to deal with this case by a clever combination of notions from different ﬁelds, such as relational algebra, graph theory and social choice theory, and by using the computer support system RelView for computing solutions and visualizing the results. Using relational algorithms, in such a case we break all cycles in each initial strongly connected component by removing the vertices in an appropriate minimum feedback vertex set. In this way we can choose a government that is as close as possible to being un-dominated. To achieve unique solutions, we additionally apply the majority ranking recently introduced by Balinski and Laraki. The main parts of our procedure can be executed using the RelView tool. Its sophisticated implementation of relations allows to deal with graph sizes that are sufficient for practical applications of coalition formation.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, 2009, pp. 487-496|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00406460|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Berghammer, Rudolf & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & de Swart, Harrie, 2007.
"Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 178(2), pages 530-542, April.
- Rudolf Berghammer & Harrie De Swart & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "Applying relational algebra and RelView to coalition formation," Post-Print halshs-00159845, HAL.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
- Roubens, Marc & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & de Swart, Harrie, 2006. "Using MACBETH to determine utilities of governments to parties in coalition formation," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 172(2), pages 588-603, July.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie de Swart & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, 2005. "A new model of coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 129-154, 09.
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