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Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints on Individual Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Béal

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Marc Deschamps

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Mostapha Diss

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

  • Rodrigue Tido Takeng

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We address the problem of selecting a committee of a specified size from a given set of candidates, where individuals are requested to provide their preferences in the form of linear rankings of the candidates. In this framework, the selection of a committee depends on the multiwinner voting rule, also known as the committee selection rule. In this paper, we assume that the candidates possess an official attribute, namely the gender identity. Additionally, the linear ordering of voters should meet some diversity requirements (such as alternating males and females positions, ranking a certain number/percentage of males and females in the top half of the linear ranking, etc.) in order to be considered as admissible for the voting process. The objective of this paper is to assess the cost incurred by implementing diversity restrictions on the preferences of voters. We present a measure for assessing the cost of diversity and calculate the maximum cost, or upper bound, for a commonly used family of multiwinner voting methods known as (weakly) separable committee scoring rules. JEL Codes : D71, D72

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Rodrigue Tido Takeng, 2025. "Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints on Individual Preferences," Post-Print hal-05068563, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05068563
    DOI: 10.3917/redp.351.0169
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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