IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04297587.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

La gestion de l'incertitude et de l'opportunisme dans les décisions publiques Les enseignements des réformes électriques concurrentielles

Author

Listed:
  • Yannick Perez

    (ADIS - Analyse des Dynamiques Industrielles et Sociales - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 - Département d'Economie)

Abstract

Par la synthèse des expériences de réformes électriques, il est possible de dresser un outil de compréhension des relations entre les parties prenantes aux réformes concurrentielles qui marquent la remise en cause de l'intervention publique. L'identification des formes que prennent à la fois l'incertitude et l'opportunisme permet de distinguer un triangle de relations opportunistes que la nouvelle structure de gouvernance devra gérer. Cette identification permet alors la compréhension des difficultés inhérentes à toutes les réformes des industries de réseaux.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannick Perez, 2006. "La gestion de l'incertitude et de l'opportunisme dans les décisions publiques Les enseignements des réformes électriques concurrentielles," Post-Print hal-04297587, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04297587
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04297587
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04297587/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, 2000. "Créance résiduelle et flux de rentes comme mécanismes incitatifs dans les contrats de franchise : compléments ou substituts ?," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 255-276.
    2. North,Douglass C., 1991. "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521394161.
    3. Littlechild Stephen C., 2002. "Competition in Retail Electricity Supply," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 1-26, June.
    4. Benjamin Klein, 2000. "The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 67-80.
    5. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 421-452.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12331 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    8. McCubbins, Mathew D & Noll, Roger G & Weingast, Barry R, 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 243-277, Fall.
    9. Glachant, Jean-Michel, 1998. "England's wholesale electricity market: could this hybrid institutional arrangement be transposed to the European Union?1," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 63-74, June.
    10. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    12. Dominique Finon & Carine Staropoli, 2001. "Institutional And Technological Co-Evolution In The French Electronuclear Industry," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(2), pages 179-199.
    13. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    14. Moe, Terry M, 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(0), pages 213-253.
    15. Shirley, Mary M. & L. Colin Xu & Zuluaga, Ana Maria, 2000. "Reforming the urban water system in Santiago, Chile," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2294, The World Bank.
    16. Jacques Percebois, 2001. "Énergie et théorie économique : un survol," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 111(6), pages 815-860.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean‐Michel Glachant, 2008. "La Deregulation Des Industries De Reseaux Comme Politique Institutionnelle De Creation De Marches Et De Mecanismes De Gouvernance," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 79(3‐4), pages 487-525, September.
    2. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.
    3. Yannick Perez, 2005. "'Credibility as a trade off' in electricity industries, a first evaluation," Global Business and Economics Review, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 7(2/3), pages 278-291.
    4. Xosé Carlos Arias & Gonzalo Caballero, 2003. "Instituciones, costos de transacción y políticas públicas: un panorama," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 5(8), pages 117-146, January-J.
    5. Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2009. "Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Following Jean-Jacques Laffont's Lead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 729-770, September.
    6. Mariano Tommasi & Pablo T. Spiller, 2004. "The Institutions of Regulation," Working Papers 67, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2004.
    7. Yvrande-Billon, Anne & Menard, Claude, 2005. "Institutional constraints and organizational changes: the case of the British rail reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 675-699, April.
    8. didier chabaud & Parthenay Claude & Yannick Perez, 2005. "Environnement institutionnel et trajectoire des entreprises : une analyse northienne de l’industrie électrique," Post-Print hal-04297605, HAL.
    9. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Research Department Publications 4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    10. Pablo T. Spiller, 2009. "An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Michel Ghertman (ed.), Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(6), pages 913-936.
    12. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    13. Yan Li & Catherine Waddams Price, 2012. "Effect of Regulatory Reform on the Efficiency of Mobile Telecommunications," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-01, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    14. Pablo T. Spiller, 2011. "Basic Economic Principles of Infrastructure Liberalization: A Transaction Cost Perspective," Chapters, in: Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), International Handbook of Network Industries, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Andrés Pavón Mediano, 2020. "Agencies’ formal independence and credible commitment in the Latin American regulatory state: A comparative analysis of 8 countries and 13 sectors," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(1), pages 102-120, January.
    16. Reuben Gronau, 2007. "Regulation—the corridor to liberalization: the experience of the Israeli phone market 1984–2005," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 287-311, December.
    17. Perez, Yannick & Ramos-Real, Francisco Javier, 2009. "The public promotion of wind energy in Spain from the transaction costs perspective 1986-2007," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 1058-1066, June.
    18. Jean-Michel Glachant, 2000. "Les pays d'Europe peuvent-ils reproduire la réforme électrique de l'Angleterre ? Une analyse institutionnelle comparative," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 157-168.
    19. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
    20. Berg, Sanford V. & Jiang, Liangliang & Lin, Chen, 2012. "Regulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 22-43.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04297587. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.