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Bank capital regulation: A role for a supranational regulator ?

Author

Listed:
  • Carole Haritchabalet

    (CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour)

  • Laetitia Lepetit

    (LAPE - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Economique - GIO - Gouvernance des Institutions et des Organisations - UNILIM - Université de Limoges)

  • Kévin Spinassou

    (LAPE - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Prospective Economique - GIO - Gouvernance des Institutions et des Organisations - UNILIM - Université de Limoges)

  • Frank Strobel

    (University of Birmingham [Birmingham])

Abstract

Using a simple two-country model where national or supranational regulators can set capital requirements as either risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we examine which of these arrangements is best. Our results demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being set at a supranational level particularly when crosscountry spillovers are large and national regulators suffer from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We further highlight the importance of allowing for supervisory "remoteness" in this context, and show that national regulators may want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small.

Suggested Citation

  • Carole Haritchabalet & Laetitia Lepetit & Kévin Spinassou & Frank Strobel, 2015. "Bank capital regulation: A role for a supranational regulator ?," Post-Print hal-02440576, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02440576
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://univ-pau.hal.science/hal-02440576
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Viral V. Acharya, 2003. "Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2745-2782, December.
    2. Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Marquez, Robert, 2006. "Competition among regulators and credit market integration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 401-430, February.
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