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Les déterminants du choix du modèle de calcul des coûts et de simulation de la valeur dans les entreprises françaises : le poids des « routines»

Author

Listed:
  • Emmanuel Okamba

    (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

Abstract

Il existe une relation déterministe entre les facteurs de contingence et les rationalités des utilisateurs des modèles de calcul des coûts et de simulation de la valeur, tel que le choix d'un modèle dépend de l'intensité des routines de son utilisateur. La prédominance des modèles du coût complet dans les entreprises françaises, montre la forte intensité de la culture de l'objet de coût par rapport à la culture d'objet de marge des agents. L'évolution des modèles de calcul des coûts est due plus à la dimension performative qu'ostensive de leurs routines.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuel Okamba, 2015. "Les déterminants du choix du modèle de calcul des coûts et de simulation de la valeur dans les entreprises françaises : le poids des « routines»," Post-Print hal-01160953, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01160953
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01160953v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 842-852, September.
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