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Corruption in emerging countries: A matter of isomorphism

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  • Bertrand Venard

    (Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School)

Abstract

This paper, based on neo-institutional literature, focuses on the influence of organizational isomorphism on corruption in emerging countries. A questionnaire was administered in face-to-face interviews with top executives in firms across various economic sectors in emerging countries. Our findings lead us to conclude that corruption is influenced by coercive, mimetic and competitive isomorphism. This study indicates that the higher the quality of a given institutional framework, the lower the level of corrupt behaviour. Furthermore, we suggest that corruption is explained by mimetism within the same economic sector. We thus conclude that a firm is more likely to resort to corruption if its competitors already adopt corrupt behaviour.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Venard, 2009. "Corruption in emerging countries: A matter of isomorphism," Post-Print hal-00771103, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00771103
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00771103
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Francois Cassiere, 2010. "Internationalization of the retailer on emerging markets between strategic choices and cultural choices, the Romanian example," Post-Print hal-03326063, HAL.
    2. Davide Torsello & Bertrand Venard, 2015. "The Anthropology of Corruption," Post-Print hal-01238748, HAL.

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