Decreasing Copyright Enforcement Costs: The Scope of a Gradual Response
The digitization of copyrighted goods and the dematerialization of their distribution over the Internet have weakened copyright, a key institution of the creative industries. One factor affecting the value of copyright stems from the broadband roll-out, wherein copyright enforcement costs have become higher than the estimated benefits of copyright. This paper analyzes the causes of this situation and suggests how a graduated response to infringers may durably decrease copyright enforcement costs. Beginning with a review of the economic literature on copyright focusing on its industrial aspects, the study then analyzes how the consumers' impunity provides incentives to “free ride” on copyright all along the vertical distribution chain. This rapidly increases copyright enforcement costs. Next, the paper describes both the graduated response mechanism and the voluntary agreement which initiated this system in France. In conclusion, this study argues that increasing the cost of free-riding for the final consumer should lead to a decrease of copyright enforcement costs and, therefore, higher returns in the creative industries.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Publication status:||Published in Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2009, 6 (2), pp.13-29|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00446189v2|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 325-363, June.
- Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring.
- Hal R. Varian, 2005. "Copying and Copyright," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 121-138, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00446189. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.