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How does symbolic success affect redistribution in left-wing voters? A focus on the 2017 French presidential election

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  • Vincent Berthet

    (2LPN - Laboratoire lorrain de psychologie et neurosciences de la dynamique des comportements - UL - Université de Lorraine, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Camille Dorin

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Christophe Vergnaud

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Vincent de Gardelle

    (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Redistribution preferences depend on factors such as self-interest and political views. Recently, Deffains et al. (2016) reported that redistributive behavior is also sensitive to the actual experience of success or failure in a real effort task. While successful participants (‘overachievers') are more likely to attribute their success to their effort rather than luck and opt for less redistribution, unsuccessful participants (‘underachievers') tend to attribute their failure to external factors and opt for more redistribution. The aim of the present study was to test how the experience of success (symbolic success) and political views interact in producing redistributive behavior in an experimental setting. The study was conducted during the 2017 French presidential election. Our sample was biased towards left-wing, and most participants reported voting for Mélenchon, Hamon or Macron. Our findings reveal that 1) Macron voters redistribute less than Hamon voters who themselves redistribute less than Mélenchon voters, 2) overachievers redistribute less than underachievers only among Mélenchon voters. This suggests that redistributive behavior is governed primarily by political opinions, and that influence by exogenous manipulation of symbolic success is not homogenous across left-wing political groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Berthet & Camille Dorin & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Vincent de Gardelle, 2020. "How does symbolic success affect redistribution in left-wing voters? A focus on the 2017 French presidential election," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-02510463, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-02510463
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0229096
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02510463
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Corneo, Giacomo & Gruner, Hans Peter, 2002. "Individual preferences for political redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 83-107, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kishishita, Daiki & Yamagishi, Atsushi & Matsumoto, Tomoko, 2023. "Overconfidence, income-ability gap, and preferences for income equality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).

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