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Corporate Governance, Innovation and Firm Age: Insights and New Evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano Bianchini

    (Sant' Anna School of Advanced Studies
    BETA, Université de Strasbourg)

  • Jackie Krafft

    (Université Nice Sophia Antipolis
    GREDEG-CNRS)

  • Francesco Quatraro

    (Université Nice Sophia Antipolis and GREDEG-CNRS
    Collegio Carlo Alberto
    Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis, University of Torino)

  • Jacques Ravix

    (Université Nice Sophia Antipolis
    GREDEG-CNRS)

Abstract

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and innovation according to firms’ age by combining insights from the recent strand of contributions analysing CG and innovation with the lifecycle literature. We find a negative relationship between CG and innovation which is stronger for young firms than for mature ones. The empirical analysis is carried out on a sample of firms drawn from the ISS Risk Metrics database and observed over the period 2003-2008. The parametric methodology provides results that are consistent with the literature and supports the idea that mature firms are better off than young ones. We check for possible non-linearities by implementing a non-parametric analysis and suggest that the negative relationship between CG and innovation is mostly driven by higher values of CG.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Bianchini & Jackie Krafft & Francesco Quatraro & Jacques Ravix, 2015. "Corporate Governance, Innovation and Firm Age: Insights and New Evidence," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-05, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
  • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2015-05
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Alex Coad & Jacob Rubæk Holm & Jackie Krafft & Francesco Quatraro, 2018. "Firm age and performance," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-11, January.
    2. repec:zbw:espost:173674 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Fabrizio Rossi & Richard J. Cebula, 2015. "Ownership Structure and R&D: An Empirical Analysis of Italian listed companies," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 68(275), pages 297-326.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Age; Lifecycle; Innovation; Non-parametric regression; ISS Risk Metrics;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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