Why Representatives Are Ideologists Though Voters Are Not
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Other versions of this item:
- Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman, 1989. "Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 29-39, April.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kalt, Joseph P & Zupan, Mark A, 1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 279-300, June.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:03:p:773-788_19 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:02:p:650-660_11 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:02:p:626-649_11 is not listed on IDEAS
- McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Scott Feld & Samuel Merrill & Bernard Grofman, 2014. "Modeling the effects of changing issue salience in two-party competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 465-482, March.
- Lodewijk Smets & Stephen Knack & Nadia Molenaers, 2013.
"Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs,"
The Review of International Organizations,
Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 447-476, December.
- Smets, Lodewijk & Knack, Stephen & Molenaers, Nadia, 2012. "Political ideology, quality at entry and the success of economic reform programs," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6130, The World Bank.
- Dur, Robert A J, 2001.
"Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?,"
Public Choice,
Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 221-234, June.
- Robert A.J. Dur, 1999. "Why do Policy Makers stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Robert A.J. Dur, 1999. "Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Public Economics 9906002, EconWPA.
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Keywords
voting ; political behaviour ; politicians ; information;Statistics
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