Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?
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- Robert A.J. Dur, 1999. "Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Public Economics 9906002, EconWPA.
- Robert A.J. Dur, 1999. "Why do Policy Makers stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mitja Cok & Polona Domadenik & Tjasa Redek & Miroslav Verbic, 2009.
"Labour market reforms in the context of political power theory: The case of Slovenia,"
Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics,
University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 57-82.
- Cok, Mitja & Domadenik, Polona & Redek, Tjasa & Verbic, Miroslav, 2008. "Labour Market Reforms in the Context of Political Power Theory: The Case of Slovenia," MPRA Paper 25524, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Klaas J. Beniers, 2005. "Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-080/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Louis Jaeck, 2011. "Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 287-301, September.
- Pitlik, Hans & Wirth, Steffen, 2003. "Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: an empirical test," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 565-581, September.
- Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007.
"Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition,"
International Tax and Public Finance,
Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-065/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Aug 2005.
- Edomah, Norbert & Foulds, Chris & Jones, Aled, 2017. "Policy making and energy infrastructure change: A Nigerian case study of energy governance in the electricity sector," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 476-485.
- Yoh, Allison & Taylor, Brian D. & Gahbauer, John, 2012. "Does Transit Mean Business? Reconciling academic, organizational, and political perspectives on Reforming Transit Fare Policies," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt6dv295b7, University of California Transportation Center.
- Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politiciansâ€™ Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1228, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kimiko Terai & Amihai Glazer, 2015. "Principal-Agent Problems When Principal Allocates a Budget," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2015-012, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
More about this item
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
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