Information and political failures: to what extent does rational ignorance explain irrational beliefs formation?
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More about this item
KeywordsRational ignorance; Beliefs; Pressure group; Political failures; Irrationality; DO3; D83; D72;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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