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The feasibility of market value accounting for commercial banks

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  • David L. Mengle

Abstract

As the severity of the problems facing the federal deposit insurance funds become more obvious, the chorus of support for some form of market value accounting is growing. Proponents cite the benefits of increased disclosure and the discipline such accounting would bring about. Opponents argue that market value accounting is infeasible because it would be too costly and too inaccurate to be worth the effort.

Suggested Citation

  • David L. Mengle, 1989. "The feasibility of market value accounting for commercial banks," Working Paper 89-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:89-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allen N. Berger & Kathleen A. Kuester & James M. O'Brien, 1989. "Some red flags concerning market value accounting," Proceedings 254, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    2. William Haraf, 1988. "Restructuring Banking & Financial Services in America," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 917739, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. David L. Mengle, 1990. "Market Value Accounting And The Bank Balance Sheet," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(2), pages 82-94, April.

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